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THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT*

I
DISCUSSION OF CHARLES FAHYt

Personally I am delighted to be here and discuss with you
the National Labor Relations Act because of my own personal
and professional interest in it, and also because I think, with
the Board, that it is a good thing for those concerned with the
administration of laws in behalf of the whole people to come
out and discuss them with groups such as this.
We are headed for quite a long day, a number of hours will
be spent, we expect, in discussing this Act. I am not going to
burden you, as Mr. Merrell indicated, with a prepared address.
I am going to be informal and I hope that you will also relax
and prepare yourselves, as we go along, for any questions that
you might want to ask. I anticipate that the discussion period,
as is usual in such gatherings, will perhaps be the most interesting part, so far as my participation in the program is

concerned.
This Act, as you know, has been controversial, and widely
debated and discussed. I think it is true, too, that it is
discussed by a great many people and that it is written about
OThe Indiana State Bar Association and the Indianapolis Bar Association
held a joint Legal Institute upon this subject on August 24, 1939 at Indianapolis.
This issue of the Journal publishes the two addresses and a synopsis of the
general discussion which followed.
t General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board.
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by a great many people, with somewhat inaccurate knowledge
as to just what it is and what it stands for and what it means.
I want to go back first into the roots that led to the flowering
of the Act, if I may use that expression.
We are a very great nation with many millions of people
in different walks of life, and we are a great deal different now
and have been for some decades than we were in the beginning. Towards the latter part of the Nineteenth Century
particularly and during the Twentieth Century thus far, we
have grown ifot only into a great agricultural nation but into
a great industrial nation, and among the people of the United
States are almost countless millions of wage earners, men who
toil and men who work for a living, in the factories and in
various types of enterprises.
Among those people there grew up sixty or more years ago
the beginning of the trade union movement in the United
States. Now, the trade union movement in simple terms
means simply that the men who work join in association with
each other in the effort to solve problems of mutual concern to
themselves and of mutual concern to themselves and their
employers. For a long period of time in this country that
right was in a way recognized but never protected. The union
movement, as it is sometimes referred to, concerned itself
with organizing campaigns in different industries and gradually gained, I think, the predominant public favor of the
country; that is, the right of labor unions to exist. The movement was led for a long period of time by the American
Federation of Labor.
But in a large part of industry, the predominant part of
industry, notwithstanding the fact that public opinion supported the right of men to organize if they could, employers
were in a position to destroy unions by the exercise of the right
of hiring and firing, to put the problem in its simplest terms.
Unions, in order to survive, where the employer was unwilling that a union live, had to fight for their lives. And yet
the unions continued to fight for their lives, and why? Because
the right of association together about matters which concerned the working men was a right that a sufficient number
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of working men felt was of sufficient importance to them and
their families that they could not abandon it.
They did not give it up; and the law recognized their right
to survive by economic warfare, that is, they could strike, and
pit their power against the power of the employer, if the
employer sought to destroy the union. So that there was recognition by the courts, as you who are lawyers know, of the
right to strike, and the right to conduct certain types of boycotts-the use of economic force. And, of course, the
employer, on the other hand, had the similar right to pit his
full economic power against the union.
That situation kept unions very often on the warpath for
recognition. The result was that, if the Labor movement was
to survive, if trade unions were to survive, they could only
survive, where they were not voluntarily accepted by the
employers, by economic strife.
Unions were voluntarily accepted by a great many employers, but they were fought bitterly by a great many more, and
yet during all that period of time public opinion began more
and more to support labor. Congressional committees were
appointed, presidential commissions were appointed, to study
the causes and effects of industrial strife and means of remedying it. Beginning at least as far back as 1898 and continuing
through the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson, then during the World War period, the War Labor Board
era, and afterwards, during the twenties, Congressional committees were created, long before there was any legislation of
the type we are discussing today. The result of the studies of
the various public commissions and of students, economists, and
statesmen, was that the almost unanimous concensus of opinion
became that the chief cause of industrial strife in this country
was the failure of acceptance on the part of management of
the principle of the right of self-organization on the part of
employes and the right of collective bargaining. It was concluded that the best solution of the problem was at once the
recognition of the basic right of self-organization and at the
same time recognition that collective bargaining was the soundest method of seeking to avoid strife under fair and decent
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conditions. The Railway Labor Act1 came into existence in
the Twenties, the first of the modern statutes, although the
history of that legislation goes back beyond the Railway Labor
Act enacted in 1926, and more recently amended in 1934.
Before that the War Labor Board itself, during the period of
the World War forecast the future trend of legislation functioning under the co-chairmanship of ex-President Taft and
Frank P. Walsh, by laying down the principles that governed
that Board in the settlement of labor relations problems during the World War. It ruled that employes had the right to
join unions without the interference of the employer, and that
that right should not be abridged by the employers. That
principle was very clearly embodied in national legislation by
the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and is the keystone of that
legislation.
Following that, there was the Norris-LaGuardia antiinjunction statute 2, and although that statute had in its substantive provisions nothing to do with promoting the right of
self-organizaion and collective bargaining, it did set forth in
its preamble the national policy that employes should have-the
right of self-organization and collective bargaining. Other
legislation followed, carrying forward the same principle. The
Bankruptcy amendments of 19343 stated the public policy of
the United States in similar language, and then came the wellknown Section 7-A of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 4
So that when the National Labor Relations Act, 5 which we
are discussing this morning, was enacted in 1935, after the
invalidation by the Supreme Court of the Recovery Act, its
basic provisions were nothing new to those who had followed
the course of development of the things that the Act stands
for. The right of self-organization and collective bargaining
had developed outside the legislative field, in the field of actual
labor relations, in industry in the United States, and also had
gone into legislation through the Railway Labor Act and into
145 U. S.
2 29 U. S.
3 11 U. S.
4 15 U. S.
529 U. S.

C. A. 151.
C. A. 101.
C. A. 203.
C. A. 707.
C. A. 151.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

other legislation such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the
Bankruptcy amendments, as the statement of the public policy
of the United States.
Now, that is something of the history leading up to the
legislation, in very sketchy form.
Let me say something as to its social and economic significance, before we turn to the precise terms of the Act. It has
been said by the highest authority (and I think no reasonable
man can dispute it) that an individual employe-I say the
highest authority, it was Chief Justice Taft in the Tri-City
case decided by the Supreme Court when he was Chief Justice-is helpless when he must be left to deal individually with
his employer, because the employer holds in his hand the individual's daily livelihood and right to work in the sense of the
man having a job. Prior to legislation on the subject, by the
mere exercise of that right with respect to the individual, the
employer could deprive the individual of his daily wage and
livelihood. And because the individual employe was helpless,
due to the superior economic power of the employer, there
came the recognition of the inequality of that situation. Public
opinion came to the support of the principle that the employes
could combine in unions in order to bring to a more equal balance the economic or bargaining power between management
and employe.
In a constitutional sense, the background of the legislation
as a regulation of commerce is that more than 50% of all
industrial strikes in the United States up to the time of the
enactment of the statute, varying from year to year, some
years dropping below 50% and some years going above
50%--were caused by the denial by employers of the right
of employes to join unions and to engage in collective bargaining. The economic losses, as well as the human suffering
resulting from that strife, cannot be calculated.
I am not going into a review of some of the terrible things
that happened in the industrial world in our country in fights
over the right of uniohs to exist, or to recount the deaths, the
suffering and the hardships that were caused by the battles
over that right. But in a constitutional sense, it is sufficient
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to say that such strife interrupted and burdened the commerce
of the Nation, and so Congress based this legislation on the
commerce power because of the relation of the thing regulated
to the protection of interstate commerce from the burdens and
obstructions of industrial war and in order to protect that
commerce.
Speaking of the statute in the constitutional sense, it went
to the causes of the burdens and obstructions to commerce
and by doing so at the same time solved the problem, not
simply of the protection of commerce, but of the protection of
men in certain rights which the Congress of the United States
determined they should have, not only should have in the sense
that they could be protected by fighting for them, but that
they were so important and so just that they should be protected by statutory enactment.
The statute provides simply that employes shall have the
right to form, join or assist labor organizations and to engage
in collective bargaining, through representatives of their own
choosing.
Fundamentally and in essence that is all that the statute is,
its substantive provisions, namely that employes shall have
the right to have self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice.
I say that is all, in substance, that the Act is. It is not an
arbitration statute; it is not a mediation statute. It does not
cover the whole field of labor relations. Congress merely by
the statute guarantees that right, the right of self-organization and the right of collective bargaining. Certain incidents
that follow from that I will go on to enlarge upon, but the
emphasis that I desire to place now is that it simply protects
and guarantees the right of self-organization and collective
bargaining.
Now, the question whether or not Congress had the power
to do that is distinct in one sense from the question of the
commerce power. Whether or not the doing of that, protecting the right of self-organization and collective bargaining,
assuming its relation to interstate commerce, could satisfac-
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torily be done without depriving the employer of his constitutional rights under the due process clause of the constitution,
was one of the main issues to be determined. That has been
determined, and not only did the Supreme Court uphold the
statute6 as a regulation of commerce and uphold it as not
depriving employers of any rights guaranteed to them by the
Constitution of the United States, but in doing so the Supreme
Court said that this statute protects nothing more than fundamental rights of employes-those were the words of the Chief
Justice for the Supreme Court-that employes have just as
much right to organize concerning matters of interest to them
as employers have the right to organize. Now, no one questions the right of employers to organize, speaking generally,
in any form that they want to. I mean you may associate
together in a corporate form or in an association or other
forms. Employers have always had the right of self-organization, freedom of association.
This statute gives the correlative right, as the Supreme
Court called it, to employes, and the reason it was necessary
that a statute do this was that with respect to employes the
right simply could not exist unless it were given statutory protection, except as it might exist through economic warfare, or
through voluntary acceptance.
Now, I say, taking the statute as it is, in its simple terms,
and seeing it only as it is, because it must be judged and studied,
analyzed and appraised with accurate knowledge of what it is
instead of what it is not, I think that the American people
generally, and lawyers must as they have in the past, agree
that the statute in protecting these fundamental and essential
liberties of employes necessary to their proper association and
economic welfare, is a just statute in its substantive provisions
because in the end it gives only to employes the rights which
employers have, unchallenged.
The guarantee of Congress could not exist, of course,
simply by a mere declaration of the guarantee. There must
be a means whereby, if this guarantee is to be effective, the
8 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301
U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
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rights can be protected where they are infringed. Congress, in
doing that, specified five unfair labor practices--enumerated
them in the statute. They are, in brief, that an employer may
not interfere with, restrain or coerce employes in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed, and he may not dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute support to it, and he may not discriminate
in regard to the hire or tenure of employment and he may not
refuse to bargain collectively.
Now, if the guarantee is right, then the unfair labor practices which are prohibited are necessarily right, because selforganization and collective bargaining cannot exist on the part
of employes unless the employer is prevented from the use of
his superior control and his economic power to interfere by
discrimination or in any other material respect with the exercise by his employes of the rights guaranteed.
You cannot have true collective bargaining; that is, the
meeting of representatives of the employes with management,
in a good faith effort to settle whatever differences there are
btween them, unless each party may freely select his own representatives in any negotiations between people who are entitled
in their own right to negotiate. The representatives who
negotiate for their constituents must indeed and in fact represent those they are supposed to represent. So that a companydominated union, that is, a union whose formation or administration is set up by the employer, is not the representative of
the employes. It is the representative of its master, the one
who created it or the one who set it up or the one who supports
it. Therefore, the Act naturally says that that may not be
done, because it destroys true collective bargaining which is
guaranteed by the statute. You cannot have collective bargaining through freely chosen agents representing the people they
are supposed to represent in the face of discrimination against
men because they engage freely in selecting their representatives; that is, by joining a union. So the statute naturally prohibits discrimination because of union activities, or any other
interference with the right of self-organization or collective
bargaining.
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In order that collective bargaining may be engaged in, the
statute makes it mandatory under certain conditions; that is,
where the majority of the employes in an appropriate bargaining unit have designated representatives for the purpose of
collective bargaining, the employer may not refuse to deal
with them for purposes of collective bargaining. He may not
refuse to recognize them and engage in an honest effort to
settle differences.
Those are the substantive provisions of the statute.
Now, how does the law go about its administration or the
carrying out of these substantive provisions? Well, there are
two branches of that subject: One, the prevention of unfair
labor practices; that is, the prevention of interference and domination, the doing away with company-unions, etc., and the
other, where there is a dispute as to whether the men have
selected representatives in an appropriate bargaining unit,
machinery is provided for solving that dispute.
The most important of the procedural provisions of the
statute, the method of functioning of the Act so far as employers are concerned, are those provisions which have to do with
the prevention of the unfair labor practices; that is, the administration and enforcement of the statute revolving around the
unfair labor practices. Those are what we call Section 10
cases.
I imagine a good many of the lawyers present are familiar
with those provisions, but I want to spend some minutes in outlining them for the benefit of those who may not be familiar
with them because I think it is important to understand how
we go about our work. I have told you now all that there is,
as I see it, to the substantive provisions of the Act.
As to the procedural provisions: there is a Board of three
men appointed by the President, and approved and confirmed
by the Senate, and there is an organization under that Board
which administers and enforces the statute, and that is this:
We have twenty-two regional offices in the principal industrial
centers, such as Indianapolis, throughout the United States,
each region under the regional office covering a certain defined
territory, and the regional office is administered by a regional
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director. There is a regional attorney heading up the legal
staff in the office, and field examiners, and the usual clerical
help.
If an employer in Indianapolis, for example, where there is
a regional office, or in any other part of the region is thought
by any one or more of his employes or by a labor organization
interested in the employes in his business, to have violated the
statute by engaging in any of the unfair labor practices, that
person or those persons may file a charge to that effect with the
Board, and under our rules and regulations, unless special permission is granted, it is filed with the regional office, and not
with the Board in the sense of the Board at headquarters in
Washington. It sets forth the details of the violation claimed
and is sworn to.
You see the Board does not act of its own motion; the Act
is brought into operation through a charge being filed with the
Board that the Act has been violated. That charge is then
investigated by the regional office. It is not at that stage a
formal Board proceeding. It is a charge that someone else
had filed with the Board which is under investigation. That
investigation has two aspects: The first is whether the enterprise alleged to have violated the statute is engaged in interstate commerce or engaged in business so closely related to
interstate commerce as to come within the jurisdiction of the
Board, under the commerce power. If not, that is an end of
it, but if so then the investigation is taken up as to the merits
of the charge.
We have had filed with us, since the life of the Board began,
over twenty-two thousand charges and.petitions for elections,
and we have closed over seventeen thousand of them in one
way or another. About sixteen per cent of all charges of the
character I mentioned have been closed out by the Board dismissing them, deciding the case at that initial stage in favor
of the employer, either because we do not have jurisdiction or
because the charge lacks merit. About twenty-six per cent of
all cases are withdrawn at this preliminary stage. Usually
they are withdrawn, though not always, on the advice of the
regional office that we do not have jurisdiction or that the

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

case is without merit. Now, that takes care of about fortytwo per cent of all these cases that we have thus far disposed
of. Fifty-two per cent additional are adjusted at that preliminary stage in a manner satisfactory to the parties concerned,
including, of course, the Board with its eye to compliance with
the Act. This leaves approximately six per cent for formal
proceedings.
Those six per cent proceed in this manner: The investigation has indicated that the case is not subject to adjustment,
that it is within the jurisdiction of the Board, and that it is
probably meritorious. At least a hearing is warranted under
the statutory procedure, and so the Board issues, by the
regional director, a complaint. The Board may issue the complaint itself, but the usual practice is that the regional director
on behalf of the Board issues the complaint. That complaint
is the formal proceeding of the Board against the respondent
employer for alleged violation of the statute, and sets forth
the alleged violation and the basis on which the Board claims
jurisdiction. With the complaint goes a notice of hearing,
which the statute says shall not be held in less than five days
and which now under our recent amended rules and regulations
may not be held in less than ten days from the time the complaint and notice of hearing are issued.
At the designated time and place, unless further time is
given for one reason or another, the case goes to hearing
before a trial examiner of the Board. The trial examiner is a
presiding quasi judicial official. He presides over the hearing
and you have a trial of the issues in the case just like you have
a trial of the issues in a court case. The respondent files his
answer, if he desires, or whatever motion he is advised he
should file. The motions are ruled on and the case goes to
hearing. It is a trial. Witnesses are called by the Board,
acting through the regional attorney or one of his assistants
who prosecutes the case before the trial examiner. There is
examination and cross-examination. The Board closes its
case, the respondent takes up his defense, calls his witnesses,
who are examined and cross-examined by the Board if desired.
There is a trial in all respects similar to a trial in court except
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we are not bound by the rules of evidence pertaining to common law trials or trials in equity, under a statutory provision
which embodies the same principle that applies to all administrative or quasi-judicial hearings; that is, that they are not
limited by the orthodox rules of evidence. Upon the conclusion of the hearing of the case, one or the other of two procedures is followed, and usually the first, which I will now refer
to: The trial examiner, after hearing oral argument and consideration of briefs if they are desired or are filed, makes his
intermediate report containing his findings and his recommendations as to the disposition of the case, which is served on the
parties. The parties may then file with the Board their exceptions to the intermediate report. The case then goes before
the Board for consideration and disposition. If desired, oral
argument may be had before the Board in Washington and
briefs may be filed with the Board. The Board then considers
and decides the case. Under the statute it is required to make
its findings of fact and to make an order, and it does so. It
makes detailed findings of fact on the record and then makes
an order for the proper disposition of the case. If it is found
that the unfair labor practices as alleged are not proved, the
complaint is dismissed. If it is found that in one or more
respects respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices a
cease and desist order is issued under the requirements of
the statute that the employer who has engaged in the unfair
labor practice cease and desist so doing. The order specifies
the kind of thing which he is to cease and desist doing, and
the statute also provides that the Board may-and the Board
usually does-make an order requiring affirmative action on
the part of the employer which will effectuate the policies of
the Act. For example, in an ordinary case of discriminatory
discharge where the man discharged in violation of the statute
is reinstated, he is made whole the losses he has suffered by
reason of the violation of the Act-that is, back pay, less
earnings while he was in the status of a discharged employe,
or if it is a company-dominated union case, the employer is
required to cease recognizing the company-dominated union,
withdraw recognition from it, and to dis-establish it as a
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bargaining agency, because it is not a true collective bargaining
agency.
There are also various other types of orders made in connection with particular cases, some of which you may want to
go into more fully.
If the Trial Examiner does not make an intermediate
report, then, before final decision, the Board itself issues proposed findings and a proposed order, to which exceptions may
be filed and argued orally or in writing before the Board.
After all this rather elaborate procedure has been gone
through with-the elimination in the preliminary stages of the
great number of cases by dismissals, the carrying through of
formal complaints, formal trial examiners' reports or proposed findings, and Board decisions, in only six per cent or so
of cases-after all that has been done, what happens to the
employer, under this statute often referred to as something
very terrible and drastic? Nothing; absolutely nothing. There
is an order of the Board that he shall cease and desist, and
that he shall take certain affirmative action, such as reinstating
men, etc. But under the statute the order thus far carries no
legal compulsion.' That is, violation of it is not a crime, and
subjects one to no fine or punishment, no imprisonment or penalty of any sort. But if it is not complied with, the Board
may take its order into a Circuit Court of Appeals in the
circuit wherein the employer resides or does business or where
the unfair labor practice has occurred. Or the employer, if he
desires to seek to have the order set aside, may himself take
it into such a Circuit Court of Appeals or into the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia, where the Board's Headquarters are, and ask that the order be set aside. This is the
statutory procedure I am giving you. Then the case becomes
in either event, whether we take it in or whether an employer
takes it in, a case for the Circuit Court of Appeals just like
any other case in the Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United
States, with the modification to that statement which I will
soon make. The record on which the whole case was decided
by the Board, going back to the complaint and the hearingthe verbatim transcript of the testimony which is preserved
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and the rulings of the trial examiner and the intermediate
report and the exceptions thereto and the Board's decision,
findings and orders, all go to the court. The whole record
goes to the Court and the case is briefed in the Circuit Court
of Appeals by both parties, the Board and the respondent, and
it comes on for argument before the Court.
If the Court determines that the Board was correct and in
fact the unfair labor practices did occur, and that the order of
the Board to remedy them was an appropriate order under the
circumstances and not arbitrary or unreasonable, it enforces
the Board's order. It makes an order enforcing the Board's
order; and if it finds in any respect that the order is not
proper or the findings are not proper, it sets aside the order
in whole or in part, and modifies it; and if an employer, after
the Court has approved an order does not comply, he becomes
in contempt of the decree of the Court. The enforcement of
the order is left to the Circuit Court of Appeals through contempt proceedings. That is the first point where the employer
is under legal compulsion.
In the review by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the order
and the record, this statute provides, as do other statutes governing Circuit Courts of Appeals or other court review of
administrative or quasi-judicial agencies' orders, that the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive. The Supreme Court has passed upon this
provision in this statute. It seems that almost every possible
question that could have been raised with respect to administrative agencies has been raised and decided under the Actalmost all, I should say. Some of you will recall that in the
Consolidated Edison decision 7 of the last term the Supreme
Court went into this matter of what the statute means about
the findings of the Board when supported the evidence being
conclusive, and again laid down the rule that "supported by
evidence" means supported by substantial evidence. So that
the findings of the Board as to the facts if supported by substantial evidence are conclusive upon the review by the court.
7 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board,
305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206.
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Now, as to representation cases: they are different, but
before I go to them, let me make this observation. I have, I
think, correctly set forth the manner in which the statute operates in unfair labor practice cases and I assert that it is fair
and should meet the approval of the Bar of the country. It is
a substitute of a quasi-judicial method, tied in with the regular
federal judicial system, of an administrative process for the
settlement of these vital and important questions which lead
to strife and dissatisfaction between employer and employe,
and it does this by a procedure that by every criterion in the
development of methods of administering law in the United
States under our Constitution is full and fair. I am not talking about the constitutionality of the Act. There is no question about that. That was fought out in the entire judicial
system in the first two years of the Board's operation and was
settled by the Supreme Court unanimously; and with respect
to due process the Court upheld the procedure of the Act and
the methods of operation under it by the Board. But aside
from this question of whether the statute is adequate so far as
constitutional provisions of due process are concerned, I say
the Act goes beyond the necessities of due process, that it is
full and fair, and when you consider the vital nature of the
rights protected by the law and the consequences to millions
of individuals of violations of those rights, and the opportunities for defense afforded employers against the accusation of
violation, and the elaborateness of the statutory and board
procedure before finally there is found a violation, it is incomprehensible to me that any reasonable person would say that
any employer is likely to be found to have violated this law,
when as a matter of fact he has not done so.
Of course, boards make mistakes, just like courts make mistakes, and sometimes the orders of the Board, although relatively few considering the full operations of the Act, have
been set aside; and even then there may be a question whether
the Board was right or whether the courts were always right.
But my point is that this procedure is not only consistent with
due process, but it is full and it is fair and that it is a far better
method of trying to settle the questions involved in the right

119
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of self-organization and collective bargaining than leaving
them only to be settled by the battle of force where the strong
alone prevail, or to the slow process of the growth voluntarily
of the acceptance of the principle of collective bargaining.
There was one additional thing that had to be done by the
statute because collective bargaining contemplates the selection
of representatives by a majority in an appropriate unit. So
the statute of necessity, it seemed to Congress, must provide a
method for the settlement of controversies as to whether or not
a particular representative who claimed to represent the
majority in an appropriate bargaining unit and thereby became
entitled to the bargaining rights for all the employes in that
unit, in fact did represent the majority. That gave rise to the
provisions of the statute contained in Section 9,8 which have
nothing to do with the unfair labor practice provisions of the
Act, but have to do only with the so-called representation
cases which arise under the statute.
Those cases are not adversary cases, that is, they are not
proceedings against employers for alleged violations of the
law. They arise on petitions of employes, and since July 14th,
on petitions under certain circumstances of employers, to
determine the question which is alleged to have arisen concerning the representation of employes. The employer, although
this is not a proceeding against him, is made a party to these
representation cases. It is interesting to note that under the
Railway Labor Act administered in comparable provisions by
the National Mediation Board, which holds elections and
determines questions concerning representation of employes
on the railroads, the employer is not even made a party to the
representation cases, that Board having considered that the
question concerning the representation of the employes was a
question which concerned the employes alone. The National
Labor Relations Board does and always has made the
employer a party to these representation cases. And that is
the type of case which involves the very difficult and sometimes
very controversial question as to what is the appropriate bar8 29 U. S. C. A. 159.
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gaining unit. The statute says that in such case the Board
shall decide whether the appropriate unit is the employer unit,
the plant unit, or the craft unit, or sub-division thereof. That
has placed the responsibility upon this Board of deciding those
controversial issues. This is not an easy job and is one that
has caused a good deal of comment and many headaches to the
Board. The unit is determined by the Board after the taking
of testimony in a hearing before a trial examiner, in that
respect similar to proceedings in Section 10 or Unfair Labor
Practice cases. The different unions and employers interested
bring forth their testimony, with the Board's attorney taking
no position in the matter as an advocate of one unit or another
where there is controversy concerning the unit. He assists in
the development of such testimony as is necessary to enable the
Board to make an intelligent decision on the facts as to the
particular plant or industry as to what the appropriate unit
should be.
, Those are the cases too in which elections are often held.
After the unit is determined the only remaining question is
whether or not a labor organization or other representative
claiming to represent the majority of the men in fact does
represent a majority in that unit. The unit really fixes the
eligibility of those who may participate in the election or designation of representatives. If there is adequate proof of
majority developed at the hearing, the Board may certify
without the holding of an election. There is a tendency now
toward the holding of elections rather than certifying on the
record, although the Board has the right to certify on the
record if there is adequate proof of the majority. So you have
these elections going on all the time throughout the United
States. I think that that is one of the most significant contributions of the Act and the Board to industrial peace, because
usually if the election is won by an organization, the employer
is ready to engage in collective bargaining. This usually follows after an election. As a matter of fact, a large percentage
of the elections are held on the consent of the labor organization or organizations and the employer. We have a great
many consent elections. We have held elections in which more
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than six hundred thousand ballots, to date, have been cast. I
do not thinkthere has been a single charge that the secrecy of
the ballot has ever been invaded in an election conducted by
the Board. The elections have inspired the confidence and
respect of the employes, the labor organizations involved, and
the employers. I am not speaking now about controversies
over units. I am speaking about the elections after the unit is
determined, the actual conduct of these elections, when the
men in industry have the opportunity to engage in the democratic process of voting by secret ballot for their representatives in dealing with the employer.
It is also significant that the percentage of participation in
those elections is almost ninety per cent of those eligible to
participate, so that these Board elections have a substantially
higher percentage of participation than any other elections
held in the United States, for political or other office.
Of course, sometimes there are protests of elections, alleging that the employer engaged in interference, and that kind of
thing must be solved. There is a procedure under the statute
which solves it; but there is no criticism, that I know of, as to
the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot or the manner of
supervision of the election by the Board, and these elections
are all held under the supervision of the Board.
I will just say a few words about jurisdiction and then I will
cease. You are probably familiar with the leading cases on
jurisdiction. The most recent one was the Fainblatt decision 9
(decided April 17, 1939) and, prior to that, the Consolidated
Edison case 10 (decided December 5, 1938) and at the previous term, the Santa Cruz Fruit Packing case 1 (decided
March 28, 1938) and then in April, 1937, the decisions in the
three cases, namely, The Jones and Laughlin Steel Corpora9 National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S. 601.
10 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board,
30S U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206.
11 Santa Cruz Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S.
453, 58 S. Ct. 4 99 L. ed. 954.
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tion,12 the Fruehauf Trailer,"3 the Friedman, Harry Marks
Clothing Corporation. 14 Those are all in 301 U. S.
It is perfectly true that the Act does not cover by any manner or means all business. But the precedents and decisions
of the Supreme Court, particularly the Fainblatt case, do give
the scope of the operations of the Act a very broad field. We
are constantly concerned with the question of jurisdiction and
it must be settled in each case. The Board must believe it has
jurisdiction before it goes ahead in each case, but it is perfectly
true now, I think, that it would be unsafe to assume that you
are not within the jurisdiction of the Board if you are engaged
in a business which in any substantial degree is engaged
directly in interstate commerce either through the receipt or
distribution of goods, or in a business in which a strike would
interfere to a substantial degree with interstate commerce. In
neither the Fainblatt nor the Consolidated Edison case did the
decision of the Supreme Court rest on the fact that the particular concern held to be within the jurisdiction of the Board
was itself engaged in interstate commerce; but the circumstances were such that the court held that a strike in these
concerns would substantially affect the interstate commerce of
others. In other words, it is interstate commerce that is protected by the Act, and not the interstate commerce of any particular party.
I have taken so much time thus far that, although I have
not said all that I would like to say, I think I should discontinue so that you will have the opportunity to ask me questions and to engage in open discussion.
Please feel free as far as I am concerned to ask any question
that you would like to, although I shall feel free, if I think it
is wise, to refuse to answer.
12 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones-Laughlin Steel Corporation,
301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352.
13 National Labor Relations Board v. Freuhauf Trailer Company, 301 U. S.
49, 57 S. Ct. 642.
14 National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing
Company, 301 U. S. 58, 57 S. Ct. 645, 81 L. ed. 921, 108 A. L. R. 1352.

II
DISCUSSION OF ROBERT LITTLER*

The widespread debate over the Wagner Act has raised
such sound and fury, and the sentiments upon it have been so
flavored with salt and vinegar, that in listening to anyone else
express his opinions upon the subject I find it helpful to know
something of his point of view. By reason of Mr. Fahy's distinguished position you naturally know his attitude. Candor
compels me to tell you my general opinions at the very outset.
I am in accord with the broad principles of the Act. I think
it is proper to guarantee by statute the right to bargain collec.
tively. The results of the Wagner Act thus far I appraise to
be generally in the public interest. As to the accusation
against the Board that it is hopelessly biased against employers, I find no sufficient objective evidence to support it; I do
not believe that the Board is conclusively prejudiced against
the American Federation of Labor. I shall be critical of a
good many things the Board members have done; but I have
great sympathy for them. It is a difficult task they have to
perform under novel and trying circumstances. The Board
has made mistakes; some of them are serious. But I cannot
say that were I on the Board I could do any better. I might
not make the same mistakes, but I might make others that are
worse. I expect that the Act will be amended somewhat to
expand it or to restrict it. I do not anticipate that the Act
will be repealed, nor that it will be emasculated. Now, you do
know what is my point of view and you can discount appropriately what I shall have to say.
The problem to which I want to address myself is this:
Assume a lawyer who is well-informed on the general subject
of law, but who has not had a great deal of experience in the
field of labor law, and assume that he is suddenly confronted
with some problem coming under the Wagner Act, what
should he look out for? I believe that most of our mistakes,
* Of the San Francisco Bar.
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Brothers of the Bar, are mistakes of omission and not of commission. If we don't know and know that we don't know, then
usually we can look it up and find, if not the answer, at least an
answer. Our worst errors are made when we don't know, and
don't know that we don't know.
Now, in all that I shall have to say I assume, of course, that
our clients want to obey the law. They may not agree with
the law, they may feel that it should be amended or repealed,
but I assume that as long as it is a law they will abide by it.
If that be not so, then I have no suggestions to offer.
Perhaps the first and most useful suggestion I can make is
as to the sources of information on the subject. I have been
asked many times, by my brothers of the San Francisco Bar,
where they can turn to learn about the Wagner Act and about
the Board. It is not difficult. The Board has published its
own rules and the statute, both in one pamphlet. I have not
yet seen the new rules, but you can purchase them from the
Superintendent of Documents for ten cents. If you catch Mr.
Fahy before he leaves, perhaps he might get you a copy for
nothing.
The reports of the Board set forth the principles established. It is quite unnecessary to buy any of the expensive
books which have been written on the subject. The Board has
published three annual reports. They are very excellent. The
last one available from the Superintendent of Documents has
brought the activities of the Board down to June, 1938. The
one which will summarize the decisions of the Board down to
June, 1939, will not be available until late in the fall. Beyond
all of this I should say the most useful place to look for
information is in the law reviews.
If you are confronted with some problem in the field of the
Wagner Act, and are not familiar with it, then if the problem
is of importance, I would suggest that you call in some attorney
who has had some experience in the field. I would never dare
say this out in California. They would think I was soliciting
business. They might be*right. But I conceive it to be a useful suggestion. If not that, I would urge that you confer with
one of the attorneys for the Board. I do not know your
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regional officers here in Indianapolis. In San' Francisco when
we get into a procedural jam, we ask the advice of the regional
attorneys; and I can say that I have always been received
courteously and helpfully. Even when I was urging a point
of view diametrically opposed to their notions, the regional
attorneys have been more than willing to take their time to
assist me to find the proper procedure.
One of the principal duties of one who is engaged in the
practice of law with respect to the Wagner Act is to see that
his clients are properly educated as to their obligations under
the law. It would seem that on this day of grace, after the
Wagner Act has been in force for four years and some weeks,
there ought to be little misunderstanding of the duties of the
employer and the purposes of the Board under the Act; but
there is. It is not easy to elucidate to a client exactly what he
must do and must not do. He may have been dealing wi'th his
men for a long time. He has helped them when they were in
trouble; when their wives piled up bills that were too large,
he has consoled them about it; and he thinks it perfectly proper
to tell them what union to join.
I find that the best analogy by which to explain an employer's
relation to his employees and their union under the law is to
say that an employer owes to the union-employee relationship
about the duty that an attorney owes to the attorney-client
relationship of another party. If you are in litigation, and
the client of the opposing counsel comes to you, and says,
"Have I a good lawyer?" your mouth is necessarily closed.
If he comes to you and asks you to help him get rid of his
lawyer, you are unable to act. The duty of the employer to
the union and to his men is substantially the same.
Another point which I think should be emphasized to the
clients is the degree of responsibility to which the Board holds
them for the acts of their subordinates. In the view of the
Board, it is not only "topside management" which may bind
an employer by an unlawful act, but the Board applies the
doctrine of respondeat superiorthrough the chain of command
clear down to the most inconspicuous of straw bosses. The
Board holds that even though the executives assume an atti-
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tude which is quite legal, nevertheless the company may be
bound by acts done by some very inconsequential foremen. In
the recent Pacific Gas and Electriccase, 1 the company was held
liable for activities of subordinate supervisory officials who
were so low in rank that they were included within the appropriate bargaining unit. They were eligible for membership
in the union. A few did join the union. Yet with some minor
supervisory authority, a few of them committed certain acts
of misconduct, or so the Board found, and the company was
held to be responsible for them. Thus, the employer is liable
not only for what he does and for what his superintendent
does, but he is also liable all the way down the chain of command, even to the most inconspicuous of them all.
Under the decisions of the Board it is almost impossible to
specify what particular acts of an employer are always lawful
and what are unlawful. You will find that most of the decisions of the Board are based on circumstantial evidence; and
it is the factors involved that are important. There is a reason for that. If an employer is going to adopt anti-union
tactics, he does not issue written instructions, or have the
policy embodied in a resolution by the directors. The whole
thing is done in a circumstantial manner. So the Board has
to consider circumstances. Therefore, we are concerned primarily with what factors are significant.
Now, let us take a typical and most usual case. When an
attempt is first made to organize the plant, what can the
employer do? The answer is nothing-nothing, either to
hinder or to help. For if he assists the union organization,
another union may come along at another time and in another
place and complain that he has interfered with them. The
Board has expressly held that it is improper for an employer
to assist any union to organize. Of course, he can not discharge the organizers even though they be agitating for a
strike. This is their right under the law. He can not spy on
the organization and its proceedings, even only to see how
well it is progressing. The Board has been most strict.
1 IV. Decisions and orders of the National Labor Relations Board 180.
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In one case I remember-it was one of the Greyhound
cases 2-there was a meeting of the union which was not secret
and the manager walked in disguising himself only by putting
on a driver's hat. He did not even wear a false mustache.
That was held to be improper. In another case, the employer
hired a stenographer to take down what was said at an outdoor meeting where any passerby could attend and hear what
was said. That was held to be a violation of the Act. In a
recent case, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board
on a finding that the employer was guilty of espionage by
listening to employees who came in to tell him what had taken
place. An employer should be extremely cautious to quarantine himself from any questionable information about union
activities.
If organization is begun, he can not move the plant, or
threaten to do so, and may even get into trouble if he'raises
wages, if it be found that his purpose was to defeat the
organization. He should also take care about such statements
as he makes to the public or to the employees. The rule of
the Board with regard to statements by employers has raised
a storm of controversy. I think in all fairness it should be
said that the Board has never gone farther than to decide
that utterances by the employer will be considered as important factors in deciding whether or not there has been a violation of the act. The theory of the Board is fairly obvious.
It is that there is such a disproportionate power between the
employer and the employees, that a mere expression of opinion
by the employer will be considered a command by the men. I
am by no means persuaded that the Board's apprehension on
that subject is at all justified by the facts. Manifestly they
must hold a very low opinion of the intelligence of the average
American workmen to conceive that employees can be so easily
dominated; nevertheless that is the view of the Board and the
law of the land until reversed. The types of statements which
the Board has found to be unlawful are those in general opposition to unions, those in opposition to a particular union, those
2 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylania Greyhound Lines, 303
U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571, 82 L. ed. 831, 115 A. L. R. 307.
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in preference of one union over another union, those unfairly
summarizing the Wagner Act, and those unfairly attacking the
activities of the Board under the Act.
It is no defense that the declarations of the employer are
true. In the Pacific Greyhound case 3 the employer said he did
not understand why bus drivers wanted to join a railroad
brotherhood because the interest of the brotherhoods was
with the railroads and opposed to the bus lines. That was
assumed to be true; but it was held to be improper. In the
NationalElectric Products4 case the employer pointed out that
if the men joined the C. I. 0., then the A. F. of L. would
boycott the products of the company. This was also true, but
was also held to be improper. So the employer should be very
circumspect about any observations which he makes on the
merits of any labor organization. He should even beware of
giving advice to the men as to what are their rights under the
Act. To be safe he should not give any advice at all, even
though his advice is correct.
Now let us suppose there is a strike. What are the employer's obligations.under the Act? The strikers are still his
employees and as such he owes them all of the duties specified
by law. He cannot replace them until he has made every
effort to settle his differences with them. In the Fansteel case 5
the Supreme Court held that he can discharge workers who
are guilty of a sitdown strike. The Board has generally held
that any strikers who have been convicted of violence can be
discharged. If there has been no conviction, but the employer
seeks to prove to the Board the fact of violence, he will find
that the Board is very strict in its requirements of proof. Thus,
even though there is violence, the employer must be cautious
about any discharge.
In connection with strikes there have been many cases where
the -mployer has been found guilty because of the performance
3 National Labor Relations Board v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 272,
58 S. Ct. 577.
4 II. Decisions and orders of the National Labor Relations Board 475.
5 National Labor Relations Board v. Fansted Metallurgical Corporation, 305
U. S. 590, 59 S. Ct. 230.
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of what would appear to be innocuous acts-calling in the
police, calling in state mediation agencies, or calling in a
citizens' committee to mediate in a back-to-work movement.
I have criticized the Board, and do now, for finding employers
guilty on a showing of very feeble connections between the
activity of a citizens' committee and the activities of the company. Hasty presumptions are often drawn on the assumption
that a citizens' committee would not be concerned in a back-towork movement unless the employer stimulated them to be
active. There is no doubt but that an employer might use a
controlled citizens' committee to try to defeat organization,
and if he does so, that is a violation of the Act. The employer
must be cautious, even with good intentions, because the Board
will quickly find a connection, and sometimes upon evidence of
which some of us might not approve.
Now, suppose an independent union is formed in the plantwhen is it lawful and when can it be recognized? Independent
unions are as proper as any -other; it is the choice of the men
that counts; but the Board is very quick to find employer
domination and support. The Board makes no distinction
between domination and support. Each is treated as being
equally bad. I differ from them on that. I think domination
is very much worse than support, but the Board has definitely
laid down the rule.
It has been held that any support given to an independent
union is unlawful, even though the union itself does services
for the employer in return for the support. In the Calco
Chemical case, the parties had adopted what was called the
"Hamilton Plan." It was named after the lawyer who invented the idea. The employer paid the independent union
for the publication of a house organ, for taking care of its
sick benefits, and its unemployment benefits. The Board found
that the independent union was company-supported and unlawful under the Act.
There are many factors in the organization of the independent union itself which the Board will regard in determining whether or not it is in effect bona fide. Does it include
persons with power to hire and fire? If so, it is certainly to

NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT

be under suspicion. Is the consent of the management required
for any act of the independent union? If so, that would be
fatal. Is there adequate provision in the union constitution
for meetings? If not, it is not regarded as genuine. Is there
a sufficient provision for dues to set up an actual working
organization? If not, it will certainly be regarded with suspicion. Is there the requirement that only employees of the
plant can act as officers and negotiate for the union? If so,
that of itself would probably disqualify it. Any substantial
departure from the accepted practices of trade unionism would,
I think, cause the organization to be suspected, although it
might not be fatal. However, even if the employer disapproves of an independent union, even if he would prefer
that his men join an AFL or CIO affiliate, nevertheless if the
independent union actually represents the men, it is his duty to
recognize it as the collective bargaining agent.
Now, from the obligations of the Wagner Act compared
with the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the employer
gets into what, in my opinion, is an almost hopeless box. Suppose an independent union is formed and the employer is required to recognize it, and then a national union, in an attempt
to organize the plant, pickets it to put pressure on the employer
to put pressure on the men to join the national union. Now,
if he yields to the picket line and puts pressure on the employees to join the national union, he has violated the Wagner
Act. If he does not yield to the picket line, then, under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court,
cannot get an injunction or restraining order against the
picketing. This particular difficulty is now on the way up
6
through the courts in the Donnelly Garment Company case.
Now, suppose that two rival organizations come and each
demand that it be recognized as the sole agent for Iollective
bargaining. The employer must not prefer one over the other
under any set of circumstances; and the steps that may be
significant are:
8 Donnelly Garment Workers Union v. International
'Workers' Union, 99 F. (2d) 309.
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First, the right to meet on company property; if that right
is granted to one union, it must be granted to the other.
Second, organizing on company time; if that privilege is
granted to one union, it must be granted to the other.
Third, the use of company bulletin boards; if that privilege
is granted to one union, it must be granted to the other.
These are the factors that appear most often in the cases
where it was found that employers discriminated in favor of
one union over another. Mr. Fahy discussed the rule which
permits the employer to file a petition for certification. I think
it is a good rule. The only thing I can criticize is that it was
adopted two years too late. To what extent it will be used
remains to be seen, but it does open up a solution to what
otherwise was a very difficult problem for employers on many
an occasion.
Suppose the employer is asked to bargain collectively. What
is his obligation under the law? Before he is required to bargain collectively, two conditions must occur. First, there must
be some formal demand upon him and an oral request or
casual inquiry is not sufficient; second, the demand must be by
a union which represents a majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining.
What is bargaining collectively? The Board has been unable to lay down any precise criteria. They say, and properly
so, that it is a matter of good faith. In bargaining the employer does not have the right to challenge the authority of
the particular officers who come to him. That ruling surprised
me. I thought the Board was going to rule the other way,
because the Board refuses to certify the authority of particular
officers of a union, and if the employer demands to see their
authority, he may be violating the Wagner Act. The Board
takes the attitude that who represents the union is the business
of the union and not of the employer.
It does seem to me if you are dealing by compulsion with a
group, the employer should have the right to check into the
question of the authority of those persons who actually do
business with him. I do not lay that down as a flat rule. In
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all cases where the rule has thus far been involved, it is only
one among other factors, but it is one to look out for.
The one objective criterion which the Board most frequently
uses in determining whether or not bargaining has been done,
is whether the employer made a counter offer. I think if I
were an employer, I would regard it as a game of chess, where
short of a checkmate the man who fails to respond to the other
man's move, loses at the game. As long as the employer keeps
pouring back counter offers, he is in pretty good shape; and
the Board says, very properly, that collective bargaining means
more than saying "yes" or "no." It means trying to get together in trying to settle differences.
One other matter of which our clients should certainly be
warned is that if an employer in negotiations refuses to grant
an increase on the ground of inability to pay, then if he fails
to support that claim by making available financial statistics to
sustain it, he is refusing to bargain collectively.
Whether or not a written contract is required in collective
bargaining is another subject which has caused its full share
of controversy. The position of the Board, as I understand
it, is that if the employer flatly refuses to enter into an agreement, even though an understanding is arrived at, then he has
not bargained collectively. The Board is entering upon a
tangency somewhat outside the boundaries of its authority on
that rule. It has always been my conception that it is the duty
of the Board to help the men organize, and to get the parties
started bargaining collectively; but from there on, the boys
are on their own. What the bargain is, is none of the business
of the Board. Whether or not the contract should be integrated in writing is a matter which is a perfectly proper subject
of negotiation. A man might be perfectly willing to enter into
an agreement in writing if he gets certain concessions. However, I am somewhat persuaded that it is a tempest in a teapot, because I think ninety-nine times out of a hundred, it is
much to the advantage of the employer to enter into written
agreements.
The Board has sustained its rule by the argument that it is
good practice to enter into written agreements, and that it is
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quite the universal practice. It is a good practice, but I feel
that is the business of the employer. So far as it being the
universal practice is concerned, it is not the universal practice
out in my bailiwick. I would say fifty per cent of the collective
bargaining is carried on without there ever being a stroke of
writing to a piece of paper. Of the remainder, most of the
contracts are not legal instruments at all, but merely memorando which are not enforceable in court. As a matter of fact,
this informality usually to be found in the industries where
collective bargaining gets along the best.
Now, what should an employer be careful about in hiring
and firing? I think the Board has been subject to a great deal
of unfair criticism as to its methods on this point. The Board
has said that a man can be fired because of inefficiency; a man
can be fired because he is contumaceous to his employer; a man
can be fired because he has red hair, or for no reason at all;
but he cannot be fired for union activity. There was an instance recently where the Board found that a man had been
fired because of temperamental incompatability between him
and the employer. This was held to be proper.
One case amused me. A man worked in a plant twelve
years, and he was discharged on the morning after he was
elected president of his union the night before. The reason
he was discharged was because he spat and missed the spittoon. They took testimony and discovered that the expectancy
of his expectoration was no less than the mean average of the
accuracy of any man in the shop. The Board properly set
aside the discharge.
The rule as to discrimination on the basis of union activity
applies not only to firing; it applies to promotion, lay-offs,
reinstatements. Any change in the relationship of the employe and employer which is based on union activities is
improper. Those problems are always difficult. I have faced
them as an arbitrator, and no one who has not dealt with
them has any notion of the labor pains that are imposed upon
the trier of the fact, when he attempts to decide whether Bill
Jones was fired for an infraction of a minor rule or for a union
activity.
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What should an employer do to protect himself against the
charge of discharge for union activity? Of course, the best
way to protect oneself against the charge is not to fire people
for union activity. But, assuming that he might be suspected
of this, how should he protect himself in advance?
A charge of general inefficiency, as Mr. Fahy said this
morning, is not sufficient. The employer must be prepared
with particular reasons and concrete and objective evidence.
If the employe is to be discharged for doing improper work,
taking samples of the work would be wise. If he is to be discharged for violation of a rule, it must be certain that the rule
was known, was properly published, and that the seriousness
of the rule was known and properly published; another factor
is whether he has been previously warned as to how serious
was the offense. How was he treated in comparison with the
way other men were treated for the same offense? But I
think the most practical protection, if you are going to fire a
man and you think you may be challenged, would be to call in
the union representative and share the responsibility with him.
He may try to dodge it if he can; but get him in there and tell
him what you are going to do and make him assume the responsibility of making his complaint then. The process of
collective bargaining does not end with the agreement. Collective bargaining continues from day to day and from week
to week.
Now, let us take another case. Suppose that your client
has discovered that a charge has been filed against him and
the Board is making an investigation of him. If he is like a
great many clients I have met, the first thing that happens to
him when he finds that a charge has been filed against him is
that he goes into an intellectual tail-spin. And you will have
to console him. When a charge is filed the Board has a right
to come in and investigate it, to find out whether the Board
has jurisdiction and whether a violation has been committed.
In my opinion, when a charge is made, the attorney can do
his best work before the complaint is issued.
Now, did you listen to those statistics which Mr. Fahy gave
this morning? Only about one out of twenty cases in which a
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charge has been filed does actually go to a hearing. Usually
the Board will not proceed and issue a complaint on the charge
unless the Board representatives are satisfied that the Board
has jurisdiction; that there has been a violation of the Act;
that it can be proved; and that the matter cannot be compromised. But if the case proceeds this far and it actually
goes to a hearing, the chances are overwhelming that there
will be a conviction. I base this statement purely upon a
statistical analysis of the record of the Board.
Whether or not the Board's policy in this matter is proper
I am not here to debate; but because of it I do suggest that
the attorney's best work can be done when the employer first
learns that a charge has been filed against him and before a
complaint has been issued. He may take the matter up with
the investigators for the Board or with the regional director.
It is certainly appropriate to go into the Board's regional office
and talk over the problem in a friendly manner.
If the complaint is filed, and you are going to go to a hearing, it would be my suggestion that it is most important to
watch the record with your eye on appeal. The Board is
somewhat informal in its general approach but it can be very
strict and very technical. Make your objections early and
continue them at every instance and occasion. Then repeat
them in your exceptions to the trial examiner's intermediate
report. At the hearing it is quite customary to enter into
two stipulations: the first, that the respondents can be deemed
to have taken an exception to every adverse ruling; the second,
that any objection made by any respondent shall be for the
benefit of all respondents. But the stipulation as to the taking
of exceptions does not preclude the necessity for the taking
of exceptions after the intermediate report.
The hearing is like any other except that evidence not admissible in courts of law is frequently received. The Board
has been severely criticized for the admission of some policies
on admissibility. Lately the tendency is to become increasingly strict, and the last time I was before a trial examiner,
about three weeks ago, he was as strict as is the Superior Court
in the City and County of San Francisco. The Board recently
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reversed a trial examiner for the admission of newspaper reports which were accepted to prove the facts stated in the
reports.
Those who are not familiar with the work of the Board
are sometimes surprised at the degree to which background
evidence is admitted in order to show the intentions and policy
of the respondent. Frequently the Board gets way off the
reservation and gives a retroactive enforcement of the Act.
In the Bethlehem Steel case, which involved acts committed in
1937, they started with a speech by Charles M. Schwab made
in 1910. Twenty-seven years is too much. In another case
they even took cognizance of the bad reputation of the attorney
who appeared before the Board. That is going to be right
hard on some of us.
The Board applies a double standard as to the admission
of confidential records. A union will not be required to produce its confidential records, and confidential records are
deemed to be those which disclose the membership of the
union. Yet the Board holds that an employer can be compelled to produce. anything he has. You should be warned
about that.
You may be surprised sometimes at the "weight of the evidence" rules which the Board will apply. I find that the
Board frequently draws hasty inferences where it is a question
of convicting an employer, and is not nearly so quick to draw
the inferences where it is a question of misconduct on the part
of the union. I think that is not any deliberate unfairness; it
arises from a too zealous effort to enforce the law against all
comers. I recall one case where a union petition was circulated
in a "mysterious manner"; so of course the employer did it.
In another case, pickets were discharged because the president
of the company got hit over the head with a baseball bat while
going through the picket line. Yet he could not definitely
identify the culprits by his own recollection. So the Board
found no specific evidence to connect the pickets with the baseball bat, and would not draw any presumption. Of course,
those are isolated cases, and extreme examples.
You are entitled to the full right of cross-examination.
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There have been occasions when the trial examiners seem to
have denied it. The Board was reversed in the MontgomeryWard case 7 on this ground. Yet it is no mean compliment to
the Board that this is the only one of all the cases which have
gone to the Circuit Court of Appeals in which the Board has
been reversed because of unfairness in the hearing. The
opinion in that case merits your examination. It is set forth
in the decision the manner in which counsel protected his record
and he did it very well.
Irrespective of the decisions of the Circuit Court of Appeals
each person must decide for himself whether or not trial
examiners are fair in the conduct of Board hearings. In the
first case in which I was engaged I became seriously aggrieved
at the conduct of the trial examiner in excluding evidence; and
I protested to the Board. Apparently the Board agreed with
me, for we were granted another hearing. The last matter
in which I participated was conducted by a trial examiner who
was one of the finest gentlemen I have met. He ruled against
me on everything I tried to put in. Of course, this was wrong.
All rulings against me are wrong. But he allowed every latitude to make a record, and went out of his way to be sure
that my offers of proof were full and complete. Trial examiners are accumulating experience. It is my observation that
the quality of their work has greatly improved. So far as I
am concerned I have no complaint to make of them and I
think it is shortsightedness in the extreme for counsel to
approach a trial examiner in an antagonistic manner and to
tell him at the outset they know they will not get a fair hearing.
There have been many proposals to separate the administrative and judicial functions of the Board. This change would
affect only one out of twenty of the Board's cases. I believe

that the possibilities of collusion between the regional attorneys and trial examiners have been overestimated.

The ex-

aminers come from Washington and are constantly on tour.
The regional attorneys, who put in the cases for the Board,
are purely local.

I apprehend that between them there is less

7 Montgomery-Ward and Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 103
F. (2d) 147.
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contact than between the average District Judge and the
average United States Attorney under the Department of
Justice.
If you are going to argue the case orally to the trial examiner, you must ask special permission. After the submission
of the case, the next step is for the trial examiner to make his
intermediate report. Here he suggests proposed findings and
makes his recommendations as to what should be the order
of the Board. Here is where you get your first inkling as to
the bad news. Your next step is to file exceptions to the intermediate report, and that is the fulcrum for all future proceedings which may be had in the matter. Any objection that you
have that is not repeated in the exceptions to the rulings of
the trial examiner is waived; and of all the steps in the proceeding this is the one that must be taken the most carefully.
Then comes the Decision and Order of the Board. It may
follow the recommendations of the Examiner or the order may
entirely reverse the recommendations of the trial examiner.
There are two provisions which are commonly inserted in
the order to which I think objection can properly be made.
One is that of posting notices that the employer will cease and
desist in interfering with the organization of the men. In at
least four cases the Circuit Courts of Appeal have reversed
the Board as to this requirement upon the ground that it
obliges the employer to admit his guilt, which is improper.
Some other decisions have taken the opposite view, but if you
feel so disposed there is the possibility of making an objection.
Another objection which I think should be made to the form
of order used by the Board, arises from the practice of incorporating into the orders the general sections of the Act. If an
employer is found guilty of discharging an employee for union
activity, he may be directed to reinstate the man with back
pay; and then the order will probably direct the respondent
to cease and desist from interfering in any manner with,
restraining or coercing its employees in their right to bargain
collectively.
Now, the vice of this general clause is that if the order is
later enforced by the Circuit Court of Appeals, and if at any
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time thereafter the employer is accused of violating the Act,
his case will not go through the ordinary procedure of charge,
complaint, hearing, intermediate report and decision by the
Board. Instead of that, he will be brought up to the Circuit
Court of Appeals on contempt. For what the Board has done
is to incorporate in virtually all of its-orders the provisions
of Section 8 (1) of the Act. The Board thus puts iself in the
position of enforcing the statute by contempt and not by the
process established by the Wagner Act itself. And the punishment for contempt may be serious.
All of this is very anomalous. For years the labor unions
have complained of injunctions granted by the Courts because
they were so general that the unions were being governed by
contempt. Now the National Labor Relations Board is doing
exactly the same thing. To the best of my knowledge this
objection has been made only once in any Circuit Court. That
was the National Motor Bearing case8 in the Ninth Circuit.
The opinion of the Court affirmed the order with a very strong
dissenting opinion by Judge Haney.
After the order of the Board, whether the matter goes up
to the Circuit Court of Appeals on petition by the Board for
affirmance of the order, or on a petition for review by the
respondent, makes no difference at all. The problems are the
same. The issues are the same. The matter is treated by the
Circuit Court of Appeals similarly to that of a matter in equity
at first instance. The respondent may not make his objections
by brief. He must file an answer or other appropriate pleading. When the Circuit Court of Appeals affirms the order, if
it does, then for the first time it becomes a binding judicial act.
For, as Mr. Fahy said this morning, until that time it is merely
similar to an interlocutory decree.
Now, what shall we say of this whole scheme? The Wagner
Act was adopted four years and some weeks ago, with the
avowed purpose and confident promise that it would substantially mitigate the public inconvenience brought about by disputes over recognition of unions for collective bargaining. It
8 V.

Decisions and orders of the National Labor Relations Board 409.
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is within the truth to say that there has been no startling and
spectacular decrease in industrial disputes. From this I would
not necessarily conclude that the Act has failed or that the law
has been improperly administered. I say, frankly, I do not
know what to conclude. I think it is extremely improbable
that the Wagner Act will be repealed. There have been a
good many proposals made for amendment and from most of
them I find myself in disagreement. There are a good many
which aim to revise the scheme for the purpose of legislating
fairness into the Board. But I know of no statutory amendment that can legislate fairness into a body if it does not exist
there otherwise. The AFL has proposed to increase the Board
from three to five members. If three are not fair, would five
be more fair? It has been proposed to set up qualifications
for trial examiners. My own experience has been that the
quality of the work of the trial examiners has been improved.
I do not know any way to legislate competence into trial
examiners any more than to legislate fairness into the Board.
Another suggested change is to set time limits within which
the Board must decide its cases. That seems impractical. We
have a time limit out in California and a rule which says the
judge can not draw his salary until a case is decided. I received
a decision the other day in a case that had been pending for
two years. How the judge drew his salary during that time,
I do not know. Time limits are of no particular utility.
I do anticipate there will be amendments to the Wagner
Act. There will be changes in the whole law of industrial
relations. It has been suggested, for example, that the Wagner
Act should provide substantive regulations for the conduct of
businesses of unions; that is, to regulate their elections, to
regulate strike votes, to regulate the manner of the conduct of
their business. I am by no means sure that this is a proper
basis of amendment of the Wagner Act. Within the next ten
or fifteen years, there is going to be regulation of labor unions.
The more intelligent labor leaders themselves know that this
is true. I should hate-to see it tried by ancillary amendment
to the Wagner Act, because it involves problems beyond the
scope of it.
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Various employer organizations have asked Congress to
extend the Wagner Act to give the Board authority to outlaw
interference and coercion by the unions. Such a proposal has
an obvious plausibility. To it, however, there are at least two
serious objections. Under conditions as they now are, if we
should place upon the Labor Board the duty of regulating the
conduct of unions with regard to interference, we would involve the Board in so much constabulary duty that the whole
machinery would bog down through sheer bewildering unworkability. Furthermore, I have profound objection to the use of
the word "coercion" in any definition of the legal duties of
labor. The history of the term is such that it is quite meaningless. What is "coercion"? To hit a man over the head
with a piece of lead pipe is undoubtedly coercion. To threaten
to do so is also. Mass picketing is generally held to be
coercive; but what is mass picketing--two at an entrance, or
three, or five, or ten, or twenty? Is it coercion for the pickets
to sing hymns? One court in Pennsylvania found it so. Some
skeptical soul inquired what hymns were sung and learned that
as the non-striking workers entered the plant the pickets made
it a practice to sing "Nearer My God to Thee." The fivefinger salute is improper in California. A Connecticut Court
has said that it was coercive to give "threatening looks." In
New York it is proper to call a non-striker a "scab" but not a
"dirty rat." That is not all. The law is that a picket line
may be coercive if it is non-peaceful, and also it may be coercive
if it is for an unlawful purpose. Yet there is no agreement as
to what is a lawful purpose. A picket line to organize a plant
is coercive in New Jersey; it is not in New York; and in California I am not sure. To picket for a closed shop agreement
is unlawful in Maine and Massachusetts; it is not coercive in
New York unless the closed shop would be unduly monopolistic-whatever that means; and in California no one can know
what the rule is until the appellate courts pass upon three cases
now pending.
So, you see, the word "coercion" literally means nothing
because it means too much. Its use is not intellectual economy;
it raises more questions than it answers. You cannot say with
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precision to what acts in human experience it definitely relates.
It is a linguistic blank. It should be excluded from any statutory amendment.
There is a modification of this idea which has possibilities.
We might adopt an amendment providing that any union guilty
of violence or intimidation would be ineligible for certification,
and no employer should be found guilty of a violation of the
Act in refusing to bargain collectively with a union which
makes a habit of these practices. I believe this principle is
sound. Under the Wagner Act the strong arm of the government has been extended to assist employees in organizing and
bargaining collectively. There is no inconsistency, even with
the present theory of the Act, in extending that assistance with
some discrimination and in saying that we will not give governmental aid to unions which adopt the "goon squad" policy to
promote their interests. Indeed, the use of the "goon squad"
is not collective bargaining at all. It is merely collective action.
It should be no disfavor to the unions to provide that we will
encourage those unions which do obey the law, but we will not
assist those which do not. The idea does not contemplate that
the Board shall restrain the use of violence; nor does it forbid
an employer dealing with a union which does so. We would
have to distinguish between the deliberate use of the "goon
squad," on the one hand, and temporary and spontaneous outbursts of fighting on the picket lines or employer provoked
violence on the other hand. The distinction will not be easy
to specify in a statute, and in actual practice borderline cases
may be difficult to decide; but these cases will be no more
difficult to decide than questions which now confront the
Board-such as the subjective state of mind of an employer
who may be trying to bargain collectively or merely going
through the motions. So far as I know there are not pending
now any amendments exactly like this, but I believe one could
be put in workable form. To it, in my opinion, no labor leader
whose intentions are honest could have any reasonable objection. I say that the idea is sound; but whether it should be
adopted right now or await more experience in this type of
regulation, I am none too sure.
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An amendment still more mild in its effect would provide
that the Board may protect the unions which it certifies from
interference from any source. It is now the law that when a
union is certified as the collective bargaining agent, if the
employer refuses to recognize the certificate he is guilty of a
violation of the law, but if a rival union interferes by establishing a picket line that is all right. Jurisdictional disputes
are completely inexcusable manifestations of union activity.
They did not originate with the breakway of the C. I. 0. and
they will survive any rejoinder with the A. F. of L. It is no
help to labor for the Board to certify a union and then to have
the processes of collective bargaining interrupted through the
avarice of a rival and disgruntled organization.
Above all these things, we shall have to give serious thought
to some fundamental considerations governing the relationship
of employer and employee in this field of collective bargaining.
What is a collective bargaining agreement? When you make
an agreement with the union, with whom do you make it? Is
*ii with the union as a unit? Or is it with the union as agent
for your employees? Or is it with the union or its officers as
agent for all of the members of the union? To the best of
my knowledge, there are five or perhaps six prevailing theories
that have been adopted by the different courts.
The Wagner Act undoubtedly contemplates the theory that
the union or its officers make the agreement for the men in
the particular plant. Now some of the AFL proposals seem
to indicate that they would like it that the agreement should
be made with the local union as a unit in itself, as an artificial
person, if you will, like a corporation. I think that position
has a great deal of merit in it and it should be seriously considered, but not as an amendment to the Wagner Act. For
that goes down to the very basis of the common law of collective bargaining. It involves questions far beyond the proper
scope of the Wagner Act.
There is another problem which I think is most serious, and
that is how we can provide for prompt and effectual enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. My own experience
has been that one of the principal sources of dissatisfaction
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between employer and employee is the petty disputes that arise
in connection with the carrying out of the agreements after
they are made. The real causes of the worst friction are not
differences of opinion over wages. It would be a great help
if we had some method of getting prompt and effectual enforcement of collective agreements at the instance of either party.
Just how that should be done, I am not sure. I think a suit
for damage is an inadequate remedy. Action in equity is too
complicated. Arbitration is not sufficient because the arbitrator
has no power of sanction. I have sometimes wondered if it
would not be prudent to consider setting up a complete set of
Labor Courts such as they have in nearly every civilized
country in the world. Whether that should be done by
expanding the Labor Board or whether it should be done by
the Federal Government at all, or by the states, are problems
that I have not yet resolved in my own mind. It is not something to be done quickly. Progress is a slow and tiresome
process. It never comes galloping in all covered with foam.

GENERAL DISCUSSION-

The employer was not permitted, under the rules of the
Board, to ask for an election until recently, but the rule now
provides that the employer may invoke the representation or
election machinery of the Board if he can truthfully allege that
a question or controversy affecting commerce-this is a formal
allegation-has arisen concerning the representation of employees. It is important in seeking an election that two or
more labor organizations have presented to the employer conflicting claims that each represents a majority of the employees
in the unit or units alleged to be appropriate. In other words,
where the employer is caught in the middle, between two labor
organizations, each of which is seeking recognition and claiming to represent the union, an election is usually held.
The employer in such a situation is permitted to file a petition with the Board under the same circumstances that the
employees are. The Board is not required to hold an election
pursuant to the employer's petition; neither is it required to
do so pursuant to a labor organization's petition. Employees
now have the same right to have an election or determination
of the question, concerning representation, where two or more
labor organizations are involved, that the employer has.
If the employer is confronted with only one labor organization, and that organization claims a majority membership of
employees, the employer cannot demand an election or determination of representation. If the employer is, in good faith,
in doubt of the majority, and is willing to resolve that doubt
with the union under so reasonable a method as an audit of
the cards, checking of cards, or consent election, and is not
using his doubt as an excuse to evade the matter, it is likely
that the Board would not hold the refusal to bargain under
*The discussion was in the form of questions from the audience and answers
by Mr. Fahy and Mr. Littler. Lack of space requires that we give a synopsis
of this discussion rather than a verbatim report.-Ed.
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such circumstances as a violation of the Act-even though it
should develop that the labor organization had a majority.
When such a question arises it is advisable to consult with
the Regional Office, and very likely the union, if it has a
majority, will assist in getting that question solved in a manner
that will satisfy the employer.
In the Remington-Rand case' the Court found that the
refusal to deal with the union was not because the employer
doubted the lack of majority, but because the employer was
determined, even if the union did have a majority, that he
would not recognize the union as it was entitled to be
recognized.
In case there are two unions competing for representation,
and the loser, after a called election, calls a strike, there is
nothing the Board can do to remedy the situation. The statute
expressly reserves unimpaired the right to strike, and the
Board has no power to prevent the losing union from striking.
Where the procedure of settling the question has been gone
through with, and has been settled, it seems that the losing
union should abide by the result of the election. But the Board
at the present time has no authority to prevent such a strike.
Employees have the right, in fact it is safeguarded by
statute, to organize voluntarily and designate any representatives they want-without influence of employer or outside
labor organizations. Such an organization could ask for an
election, but there must be no employer influence in such an
undertaking. The statute prohibits the employer from taking
part in any such movement. Before the Board will hold an
election for a company union it first disposes of the charge, if
there is one, that the organization is company-dominated.
The Supreme Court has held 2 that the Board has the power
to require the company to dissolve a company union as a collective bargaining agency, and that although a majority of the
employees voted in favor of the company union, such a union
could not be a proper bargaining agency. In a number of cases
1 National

Labor Relations Board v. Remington-Rand, 9+ F. (2d) 862.

2 National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303

U. S. 261, 58 S. Ct. 571, 82 L. ed. 831, 115 A. L. R. 307.
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the Circuit Courts followed the rule of dissolving a companydominated union-upholding in each case a Board order. Last
spring, however, in the Newport News Dry Dock case,3 the
Fourth Circuit, struck out that part of the Board's ruling requiring the company-dominated union to be dissolved. The
opinion was written by Judge Parker, and it is possible that it
will be reversed by the Supreme Court, and that the Greyhound precedent set by the latter court followed.
The companies that have collected dues from organizations
that were found to be company-dominated have been required
to repay to the men the dues collected or withheld. Those who
have unusual labor problems should avail themselves of their
opportunity to discuss the matter with the Regional Office.
A dosed shop is not valid under the statute unless it is made
by contract with a majority of the employees. It is valid for
an employer to make a dosed shop agreement with a majority
of his employees, but he must not do anything to influence or
coerce the union after or before, the agreement is signed.
In the Globe Cotton Mills case, 4 decided last March 30, the
Court defined collective bargaining as follows:
"We believe there is a duty on both sides, though difficult of legal
enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and
assign certain purpose to find a basis of agreement, touching wages and
hours and conditions of labor, which shall stand as a mutual guarantee
of conduct, and as a guide for the adjustment of grievances."
And in the ConsolidatedEdison case,5 in discussing the purpose
of the act, the Court said:
"The act contemplates the making of contracts with labor organizations; that is the manifest objective in providing for collective
bargaining."
The employer has a perfect right to discuss hours and wages
and conditions of employment, provided he does not go into
3 National Labor Relations Board v. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Co., 101 F. (2d) 841.
4 Globe Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board, 103 F. (2d) 91.
5 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. National Labor Relations Board,
305 U. S. 197, 59 S. Ct. 206.
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influencing the men as to whether or not they join a union.
Wages and hours and working conditions, terms of employment, are certainly not a forbidden field, but are subjects which
may properly be discussed. The employer must not exert
influence which he has as an employer, in the field of employment, in discussing organizations with his employees. He
must leave the men with a free choice. However, he has the
right to discuss terms of employment. If employees of the
company, from foreman to straw boss, attempt to exert any
influence on the workers, the position of the employer is
jeopardized. Supervisory employees exert an influence over
the men, in that they submit ratings, and make recommendations. The employer should take care that none of his foremen or persons associated with the management advise the
general employees.
As to the rights the minority group has in a plant that has
voted to go to one union or another-they may submit grievances and no more. The minority workmen are in the position
of a Democrat in a Republican district.
It is uniform practice for the Labor Board or its regional
office to notify an employer that a charge has been filed against
him. The employer is not notified at this point as to the
nature of the charge for several reasons; the employer is protected from adverse publicity; the charge may be wholly unfounded; the Board wishes to discuss the merits of the charge
before the complaint issues, and to obtain the employer's version of events.
The policy of the Labor Board during the last eighteen
months has been to treat employer and union alike in the
search for evidence. During the first few years of the statute
the subpoena was used more freely against the employer, but
this has been curbed and there have been no complaints in the
last few months.
If an organizer attempts to unionize a factory which is
opposed to the incoming union the employer should petition
the Labor Board to hold an election.
The Labor Board is perfectly willing to take stipulations
as to methods of running a business but it usually requires
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evidence to prove jurisdictional factors.

This is done for

purposes of the record. When the men get out from under the
influence of the company-dominated union they may form their
own bargaining agency, but it must be free of the influence of
the old organization. The new organization has the burden
of proving that domination no longer exists. In the Telephone
case the Board found that the reformed organization was
free of the influence of the employer and the proceedings were
dismissed.
The employer may make and enforce the rule that all
organizational activities must be carried on after hours and
off the premises of the company. There has only been one
exception to this general rule, and that was in a lumber mill
case. The company owned an entire town, including the
homes in which the men lived. The Board felt that the rule
that no union activities should be carried on in the town, which
was all company property, was too rigid.
When a labor organizer comes to a factory his usual mode
-of procedure is to tell the men that he will secure for them a
new and better contract. Under these circumstances the men
usually "sound out" the management to see whether or not
this is possible. It is proper for the employer to state to the
men that the terms under which they are working will not be
changed. Where there is a contract made with the majority,
the Board will not in itself go in and disturb the situation on
the petition of a union who claims a majority pending the
lapse of a reasonable period of time, which the Board regards
as not less than a year. It was pointed out earlier that the
Board has no authority to prevent the organization claiming
a majority from calling a strike even though an election has
just been held.
Frequently after a contract has been signed the union
organizer misrepresents the contract to the men, saying that
a lot more has been accomplished by its terms than actually is
the case. It would not be proper in these circumstances to
send copies of the contract to the employees. The Board feels
that if collective bargaining is to be effective the management
must deal through the organization's representatives, and that
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it is an unfair practice to run around these selected representatives to go directly to the employees.
This seems inconsistent with the policy set up by the Board
which requires the company involved in a labor dispute to
remove a selected representative that union leaders refuse to
bargain with. A company may be required under Section 8,
(5), to remove a foreman on the demand of the union. The
question usually arises because the union refuses to bargain
as long as a certain individual has the position of a foreman.
The removal of a foreman is a proper subject for a labor
dispute.
In the situation where the employer concludes an agreement
with the union for one year, and is approached, when production lines are crowded, for the next year's contract, he may
generally refuse to bargain with the union. It is difficult to
answer the question categorically, but under normal conditions
a refusal to bargain would not be a violation of the Act.
The employer who is asked to allow Community Chest
solicitors and similar groups to contact employees during hours
frequently raises the question whether the act is violated if the
same soliciting privilege is refused organizers. The Board has
not had occasion to rule on the question, but counsel for the
Board advised an employer that the Act would not be violated
by refusing the privilege.
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